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The report is here (85 page pdf).
I cut and pasted the findings:
WaPo has a couple of takeaways here.
Now, how do you suppose the killers might know who's been working with the FBI? I wonder.
I cut and pasted the findings:
FINDING #1: In the months before the attacks on September 11,2012, the IC
provided ample strategic warning that the security situation in eastern Libya
was deteriorating and that U.S. facilities and personnel were at risk in
Benghazi.
FINDING #2: The State Department should have increased its security
posture more significantly in Benghazi based on the deteriorating security
situation on the ground and IC threat reporting on the prior attacks against
Westerners in Benghazi -- including two incidents at the Temporary Mission
Facility on April 6 and June 6, 2012.
FINDING #3: There was no singular "tactical warning" in the intelligence
reporting leading up to the events on September 11, 2012, predicting an attack
on U.S. facilities in Benghazi on the 9/11 anniversary, although State and the
CIA both sent general warning notices to facilities worldwide noting the
potential security concerns associated with the anniversary. Such a specific
warning should not have been expected, however, given the limited
intelligence collection of the Benghazi area at the time.
FINDING #4: Although the IC relied heavily on open source press reports in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the IC conducted little analysis of
open source extremist-affiliated social media prior to and immediately after
the attacks.
FINDING #5: There were "tripwires" designed to prompt a reduction in
personnel or the suspension of operations at the Mission facility in Benghazi
and although there is evidence that some of them had been crossed, operations
continued with minimal change. Some nations closed their diplomatic
facilities in Benghazi as the security conditions deteriorated during the
summer of 2012, but other nations stayed along with the United States,
contrary to some public reports and statements that the U.S. was the last
country represented in Benghazi.
FINDING #6: The State Department personnel at the Temporary Mission
Facility in Benghazi relied on the security officers at the CIA Annex as a last
resort for security in the event of an attack.
FINDING #7: There were no U.S. military resources in position to intervene
in short order in Benghazi to help defend the Temporary Mission Facility and
its Annex on September 11 and 12, 2012.
FINDING #8: Unarmed U.S. military surveillance assets were not delayed
when responding to the attack, and they provided important situational
awareness for those under siege during the attacks against the Temporary
Mission Facility and the Annex on September 11 and 12,2012.
FINDING #9: In finished reports after September 11, 2012, intelligence
analysts inaccurately referred to the presence of a protest at the Mission
facility before the attack based on open source information and limited
intelligence, but without sufficient intelligence or eyewitness statements to
corroborate that assertion. The IC took too long to correct these erroneous
reports, which caused confusion and influenced the public statements of
policymakers.
FINDING #10: The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) did not disseminate any independent analysis in the year following the
Benghazi attacks.
FINDING #11: The DNI's Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS)
failed to provide complete and accurate information to Congress during its
review of the Benghazi attacks. The Committee found AIS's methodology in
assembling documents to be flawed. Despite repeated requests from the
Committee, AIS also refused to provide complete, accurate, and thoroughly
cited information to Congress.
FINDING #12: The co-location of IC and diplomatic personnel in Benghazi
could have enhanced security; but co-location often presents tradeoffs that
should be carefully evaluated in high-threat environments.
FINDING_ #13: The primary Source of security for the Temporary Mission
Facility, local Libyan militia members, failed to provide any significant
defense of the compound from the attack.
FINDING #14: More than a year after the Benghazi attacks, the terrorists
who perpetrated the attacks have still not been brought to justice. The IC has
identified several individuals responsible for the attacks. Some of the
individuals have been identified with a strong level of confidence. However,
insight into the current whereabouts and links between these individuals in
some cases is limited due in part to the nascent intelligence capabilities in the
region.
provided ample strategic warning that the security situation in eastern Libya
was deteriorating and that U.S. facilities and personnel were at risk in
Benghazi.
FINDING #2: The State Department should have increased its security
posture more significantly in Benghazi based on the deteriorating security
situation on the ground and IC threat reporting on the prior attacks against
Westerners in Benghazi -- including two incidents at the Temporary Mission
Facility on April 6 and June 6, 2012.
FINDING #3: There was no singular "tactical warning" in the intelligence
reporting leading up to the events on September 11, 2012, predicting an attack
on U.S. facilities in Benghazi on the 9/11 anniversary, although State and the
CIA both sent general warning notices to facilities worldwide noting the
potential security concerns associated with the anniversary. Such a specific
warning should not have been expected, however, given the limited
intelligence collection of the Benghazi area at the time.
FINDING #4: Although the IC relied heavily on open source press reports in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the IC conducted little analysis of
open source extremist-affiliated social media prior to and immediately after
the attacks.
FINDING #5: There were "tripwires" designed to prompt a reduction in
personnel or the suspension of operations at the Mission facility in Benghazi
and although there is evidence that some of them had been crossed, operations
continued with minimal change. Some nations closed their diplomatic
facilities in Benghazi as the security conditions deteriorated during the
summer of 2012, but other nations stayed along with the United States,
contrary to some public reports and statements that the U.S. was the last
country represented in Benghazi.
FINDING #6: The State Department personnel at the Temporary Mission
Facility in Benghazi relied on the security officers at the CIA Annex as a last
resort for security in the event of an attack.
FINDING #7: There were no U.S. military resources in position to intervene
in short order in Benghazi to help defend the Temporary Mission Facility and
its Annex on September 11 and 12, 2012.
FINDING #8: Unarmed U.S. military surveillance assets were not delayed
when responding to the attack, and they provided important situational
awareness for those under siege during the attacks against the Temporary
Mission Facility and the Annex on September 11 and 12,2012.
FINDING #9: In finished reports after September 11, 2012, intelligence
analysts inaccurately referred to the presence of a protest at the Mission
facility before the attack based on open source information and limited
intelligence, but without sufficient intelligence or eyewitness statements to
corroborate that assertion. The IC took too long to correct these erroneous
reports, which caused confusion and influenced the public statements of
policymakers.
FINDING #10: The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) did not disseminate any independent analysis in the year following the
Benghazi attacks.
FINDING #11: The DNI's Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS)
failed to provide complete and accurate information to Congress during its
review of the Benghazi attacks. The Committee found AIS's methodology in
assembling documents to be flawed. Despite repeated requests from the
Committee, AIS also refused to provide complete, accurate, and thoroughly
cited information to Congress.
FINDING #12: The co-location of IC and diplomatic personnel in Benghazi
could have enhanced security; but co-location often presents tradeoffs that
should be carefully evaluated in high-threat environments.
FINDING_ #13: The primary Source of security for the Temporary Mission
Facility, local Libyan militia members, failed to provide any significant
defense of the compound from the attack.
FINDING #14: More than a year after the Benghazi attacks, the terrorists
who perpetrated the attacks have still not been brought to justice. The IC has
identified several individuals responsible for the attacks. Some of the
individuals have been identified with a strong level of confidence. However,
insight into the current whereabouts and links between these individuals in
some cases is limited due in part to the nascent intelligence capabilities in the
region.
“The attacks were preventable, based on extensive intelligence reporting on the terrorist activity in Libya — to include prior threats and attacks against Western targets — and given the known security shortfalls at the U.S. Mission,†the panel said in a statement.
The report also noted, chillingly, that the FBI’s investigation into the attacks has been hampered in Libya, and that 15 people “supporting the investigation or otherwise helpful to the United States†have since been killed in Benghazi. The report said it was unclear whether those killings were related to the investigation.
The report also noted, chillingly, that the FBI’s investigation into the attacks has been hampered in Libya, and that 15 people “supporting the investigation or otherwise helpful to the United States†have since been killed in Benghazi. The report said it was unclear whether those killings were related to the investigation.
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